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The Collateral Channel: 
How Real Estate Shocks Affect Corporate Investment†
By Thomas Chaney, David Sraer, and David Thesmar*
What is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment? In 
the presence of financing frictions, firms use pledgeable assets as 
collateral to finance new projects. Through this collateral channel, 
shocks to the value of real estate can have a large impact on aggre-
gate investment. To compute the sensitivity of investment to collateral 
value, we use local variations in real estate prices as shocks to the 
collateral value of firms that own real estate. Over the 1993–2007 
period, the representative US corporation invests $0.06 out of each 
$1 of collateral. (JEL D22, G31, R30)
In the presence of contract incompleteness, Barro (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), and Hart and Moore (1994) point out that collateral pledging enhances a 
firm’s financial capacity. Providing outside investors with the option to liquidate 
pledged assets ex post acts as a strong disciplining device on borrowers. This, in 
turn, eases financing ex ante. Asset liquidation values thus play a key role in the 
determination of a firm’s debt capacity. This simple observation has important mac-
roeconomic consequences: as noted by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997), business downturns will deteriorate assets values, thus reduc-
ing debt capacity and depressing investment, which will amplify the downturn. 
This “collateral channel” is often the main suspect for the severity of the Great 
Depression (Bernanke 1983) or for the extraordinary expansion of the Japanese 
economy at the end of the 1980s (Cutts 1990). In the current context of abruptly 
declining real estate prices in the United States, an assessment of the relevance of 
this “collateral channel” is called for. This paper attempts to empirically uncover the 
microeconomic foundation for this mechanism.
We show that over the 1993–2007 period, a $1 increase in collateral value leads 
the representative US public corporation to raise its investment by $0.06. This 
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sensitivity can be quantitatively important in the aggregate. This is because real 
estate represents a sizable fraction of the tangible assets that firms hold on their 
balance sheet. As we show in this paper, in 1993, among public firms in the United 
States, 59 percent reported at least some real estate ownership. Among these land-
holding firms, the market value of real estate accounted for 19 percent of the firm’s 
total market value. To get at this $0.06 sensitivity, we use variations in local real 
estate prices, either at the state or the city level, as shocks to the collateral value of 
land-holding firms. We measure how a firm’s investment responds to each additional 
dollar of real estate that the firm actually owns, and not how investment responds 
to real estate shocks overall. This empirical strategy uses two sources of identifica-
tion. The first comes from the comparison, within a local area, of the sensitivity of 
investment to real estate prices across firms with and without real estate. The sec-
ond comes from the comparison of investment by land-holding firms across areas 
with different variations in real estate prices. The methodology is similar to Case, 
Shiller, and Quigley (2001) in their study of home wealth effects on household 
consumption.
Two sources of endogeneity might affect our estimation: (i) real estate prices 
may be correlated with the investment opportunities of land-holding firms, and 
(ii) the decision to own or lease real estate may be correlated with the firm’s 
investment opportunities. As in Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) or Mian 
and Sufi (2011), we address the first source of endogeneity by instrumenting local 
real estate prices using the interaction of long-term interest rate with local hous-
ing supply elasticity. We do not have a proper set of instruments to deal with 
the second source of endogeneity. We make two attempts at gauging the severity 
of the bias it may cause. We first control for the observable determinants in the 
ownership decision, which leaves the estimation unchanged. Second, we estimate 
the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices for firms that acquire real estate 
before and after they do so. Before acquiring real estate, future purchasers are sta-
tistically indistinguishable from firms that never own real estate. The sensitivity of 
their investment to real estate prices becomes large, positive, and significant only 
after they acquire real estate.
Our article is related to the recent, emerging literature on collateral and invest-
ment. Gan (2007), in an important contribution, showed, using a difference-in-
differences like approach, that land-holding Japanese firms were more affected by 
the burst of the real estate bubble in the beginning of the 1990s than firms with no 
real estate. We view our contribution as complementary. First, one might worry 
that, because the Japanese economy is bank oriented, the role of collateral is much 
larger than in a more market-based economy like the United States. Second, her 
paper exploits extreme market conditions, and, in particular, a period where banks 
in Japan were distressed. This might affect the degree of financing frictions that 
firms face and, hence, lead to an upward bias of the effect. While we provide spe-
cific evidence on the recent real estate bubble, we also use a large US sample over 
a long period, covering mostly “normal” market conditions. Third, the fact that the 
burst of the Japanese real estate bubble in the late 1980s was so large means that 
there is very little variation in real estate price movements between different loca-
tions within Japan, as reported by Gan using prefecture-level prices. In our data, 
the large dispersion in price movements between US states and cities allows us to 
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control for local market conditions more precisely, and to rely on weaker identify-
ing assumptions. The identification assumption in Gan (2007) is that land-holding 
firms were not differentially affected by the burst of the bubble when compared to 
non–land-holding firms. This is a strong assumption  considering that land-holding 
firms are larger firms that might have been more exposed, for instance, to exchange 
rates swings contemporaneous to the bubble. Our identifying assumption requires 
only that land-holding and non–land-holding firms have the same reaction to varia-
tions in local real estate prices, a much weaker assumption.1 Another important 
contribution is Peek and Rosengren (2000), who look at the supply side of credit. 
Based also on the Japanese real estate bubble, they show that banks owning depreci-
ated real estate assets cut their credit supply, leading to a decrease in their clients’ 
investment.2
Finally, our article is also closely related to recent works that try to highlight 
the role of collateral in financial contracts. Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz 
(2005) document that more liquid (or more “redeployable”) pledgeable assets are 
financed with loans of longer maturities and durations. Benmelech and Bergman 
(2008) documents how US airline companies are able to take advantage of lower 
collateral value to renegotiate ex post their lease obligation downward. Finally, 
Benmelech and Bergman (2009) construct industry-specific measures of redeploy-
ability and show that more redeployable collateral leads to lower credit spreads, 
higher credit ratings, and higher loan-to-value ratios. While we do not go into such 
details in the examination of financial contracts, our article contributes to this lit-
erature by empirically emphasizing the importance of collateral for financing and 
investment decisions.3
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section I presents the con-
struction of the data and summary statistics. Section II describes our main empirical 
results on investment and capital structure decisions. Section III concludes.
I. Data
We use accounting data on US listed firms, merged with real estate prices at the 
state and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.
A. Accounting Data
We start from the sample of active COMPUSTAT firms in 1993 with nonmissing 
total assets (COMPUSTAT item No. 6). This provides us with a sample of 9,211 
firms and a total of 83,683 firm-year observations over the period 1993–2007. We 
keep firms whose headquarters are located in the United States and exclude from the 
sample firms operating in the finance, insurance, real estate, construction, and min-
ing industries, as well as firms involved in a major takeover operation. We require 
1 Another contribution looking at collateral shocks triggered by the Japanese crisis can be found in Goyal and 
Yamada (2004).
2 Gan (2007) also uses the Japanese crisis as a shock to banks’ health and identifies the importance of bank health 
on their clients’ investment.
3 For other contributions emphasizing the role of collateral in boosting pledgeable income, see, among others, 
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) and Rampini and Viswanathan (2010).
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firms to have available data every consecutive year they appear in the sample. We 
keep only firms that appear at least three consecutive years in the sample. This leaves 
us with a sample of 5,584 firms and 50,858 firm-year observations.
Real Estate Assets.—We collect data on the value of real estate assets of each firm. 
After measuring the initial market value of real estate assets of each firm, we will 
identify variations in their value coming from variations in real estate prices across 
space and over time.
First, we measure the market value of real estate assets. Following Nelson, Potter, 
and Wilde (2000), three major categories of property, plant, and equipment are 
included in the definition of real estate assets: Buildings, Land and Improvement, 
and Construction in Progress. Unfortunately, these assets are not marked-to-market, 
but valued at historical cost. To recover their market value, we calculate the average 
age of those assets and use historical prices to compute their current market value. 
The procedure is as follows. The ratio of the accumulated depreciation of buildings 
(COMPUSTAT item No. 253) to the historic cost of buildings (COMPUSTAT item 
No. 263)4 measures the proportion of the original value of a building claimed as 
depreciation. Based on a depreciable life of 40 years,5 we compute the average age 
of buildings for each firm. We infer the market value of a firm’s real estate assets 
for each year in the sample period (1993–2007) by inflating their historical cost 
with state-level residential real estate inflation after 1975, and CPI inflation before 
1975.6, 7
The accumulated depreciation on buildings is no longer available in COMPUSTAT 
after 1993.8 This is why, when measuring the value of real estate, we restrict our 
sample to firms active in 1993. There are 2,792 firms in 1993 in our sample for 
which we are able to construct a measure of the market value of real estate assets 
and 27,543 corresponding firm-year observations. Table 1 reveals two striking facts. 
In 1993, 59 percent of all US public firms reported some real estate ownership. 
Moreover, for the median firm in the entire sample, the market value of real estate 
represents 28.4 percent of the book value of Property, Plants and Equipment (and 
4 percent of the firm’s total market value). For the median land-holding firm in 
COMPUSTAT, the market value of real estate represents 95 percent of the book 
value of Property, Plant and Equipment and 19.3 percent of the firm’s total market 
value. Real estate is thus a sizable fraction of the tangible assets that corporations 
hold on their balance sheet.
Second, to measure accurately how the value of real estate assets evolves, we need 
to know the location of these assets. COMPUSTAT does not provide us with the 
geographic location of each specific piece of real estate owned by a firm. However, 
4 Unlike buildings, land and improvements are not depreciated.
5 As in Nelson, Potter, and Wilde (2000), this assumption can be tested by estimating annual depreciation 
amounts (as the change in total depreciation). Building cost, when divided by annual depreciation, provides an 
estimate of depreciable life. Although inconsistent, the average life estimated by this approach ranges from 38 to 45 
years. This confirms our assumption of a 40-year-life.
6 Real estate assets at cost are defined as Land and Improvements (COMPUSTAT item No. 260), Buildings 
(COMPUSTAT item No. 263), and Construction in Progress (COMPUSTAT item No. 266).
7 For firms with missing book value of real estate assets in 1993, we assign a book value of 0 in 1993 if they have 
a 0 book value of real estate assets in 1994.
8 In 1994, ten of the 15 schedules required for Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system 
(EDGAR) filings were eliminated. In particular, the accumulated depreciation on Buildings is no longer reported.
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the data reports headquarter location (variables STATE and COUNTY). We use the 
headquarter location as a proxy for the location of real estate. There are two assump-
tions underlying this choice. First, headquarters and production facilities tend to be 
clustered in the same state and MSA. Second, headquarters represent an important 
fraction of corporation real estate assets. To support these assumptions, we manually 
collected information on the location of a firm’s real estate using its 10K files. We 
discuss these data in detail in Section IC.
Other Accounting Data.—Aside from data on real estate, we use other accounting 
variables and construct ratios as is typically done in the corporate finance literature. 
Table 1—Summary Statistics
Mean Median SD
25th
percentile
75th
percentile Obs.
Firm-level data
 Investment 0.35 0.21 0.40 0.11 0.41 27,201
Δ(PPE) − (RE) 0.06 0.00 0.34 −0.08 0.13 23,593
3 years mean CAPEX 0.42 0.24 0.47 0.13 0.48 21,186
Industry-adj. CAPEX 0.01 −0.09 0.39 −0.21 0.07 27,173
Cash 0.01 0.26 1.76 −0.11 0.59 27,407
Market/Book 2.18 1.53 1.76 1.11 2.48 25,210
Debt Issues 0.48 0.01 1.02 0.00 0.38 26,336
Debt Repayment 0.35 0.08 0.65 0.00 0.33 26,825
Net Debt Issues 0.08 0.00 0.50 −0.08 0.06 25,760
Changes in current debt 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 27,543
RE Value (State - residential) 0.86 0.28 1.36 0.00 1.12 27,543
RE Value (MSA - residential) 0.83 0.24 1.34 0.00 1.10 26,107
RE Value (MSA - office) 0.77 0.09 1.27 0.00 1.01 20,353
State Residential Price Index 0.59 0.55 0.20 0.43 0.72 27,543
MSA Residential Price Index 0.59 0.56 0.20 0.41 0.72 26,138
MSA Office Price Index 0.68 0.69 0.21 0.52 0.80 20,589
Local Housing Supply Elasticity 1.17 0.90 0.67 0.65 1.31 22,916
Initial firm level data (1993)
RE OWNER 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 2,792
Log (asset) 4.08 3.97 2.19 2.61 5.49 2,791
ROA 0.00 0.07 0.25 −0.03 0.12 2,782
Age 12.22 8.00 10.57 3.00 19.00 2,792
10K information on headquarter ownership (1997)
HQ OWNER 0.24 0 0.429 0 0 3,727
Notes: Investment is defined as capital expenditure (item No. 128) normalized by the lagged book value of properties, 
plant and equipment (PPE: item No. 8). “Δ(PPE) − Δ(RE)” is the yearly growth in PPE minus the yearly growth in 
real estate assets, normalized by lagged PPE (item No. 8). “3 years mean CAPEX” is the average capex over the next 
three years normalized by lagged PPE. “Industry-adj. CAPEX” is the firm CAPEX minus the average CAPEX in the 
industry normalized by lagged PPE. Cash is defined as income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amor-
tization (item No. 14 + item No. 18) normalized by lagged PPE (item No. 8). Market/Book is defined as the market 
value of assets (item No. 6 + (item No. 60 × item No. 24) − item No. 60 − item No. 74) normalized by their book 
value (item No. 6). Debt Issues is defined as item No. 111 normalized by lagged PPE (item No. 8). Debt Repayment 
is defined as item No. 114 normalized by lagged PPE (item No. 8). Net Debt Issues is defined as Debt Issuance minus 
Debt Repayment. Changes in current debt is defined as item No. 301 normalized by lagged PPE (item No. 8). RE 
Value is the ratio of the market value of real estate assets normalized by lagged PPE (see Section I for details on the 
construction of this variable). RE OWNER is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports any real estate holding 
in 1993. ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation minus depreciation and amortization normalized 
by total assets ((item No. 13 − item No. 14)/item No. 6). Age is the number of years since IPO. MSA/State Level 
Residential Prices Growth Rate (resp. Index) is the growth rate (resp. level normalized to 1 in 2006) of the MSA/State 
OFHEO real estate price index. Office Prices Growth Rate (resp. Index) is the growth rate (resp. level normalized to 1 
in 2006) of MSA level office price index. Local Housing Supply Elasticity comes from Saiz (2010). HQ OWNER is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports headquarter ownership in its 1997 10K files.
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We compute investment rate as the ratio of capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT 
item No. 128) to past year’s Property Plant and Equipment (lagged item No. 8).9 
We  compute the Market-to-Book ratio as follows: we take the total market value of 
equity as the number of common stocks (item No. 25) times end-of-year close price 
of common shares (item No. 24). To this, we add the book value of debt and quasi 
equity, computed as book value of assets (item No. 6) minus common equity (item 
No. 60) minus deferred taxes (item No. 74). We then normalize the resulting firm’s 
“market” value using book value of assets (item No. 6). We also use the ratio of cash 
flows (item No. 18 plus item No. 14) to past year’s PPE (lagged item No. 8).
We use COMPUSTAT to measure debt issuance. We measure long term debt 
issues as long term debt issuance (item No. 111) normalized by lagged PPE (lagged 
item No. 8). We also compute long term debt repayment (item No. 114) divided by 
lagged PPE. Finally, only the net change in current debt (item No. 301) is available 
in COMPUSTAT, and we also normalize it by lagged PPE. Net change in long term 
debt is defined as long term issuance minus long term repayments normalized by 
PPE. Because data on issuances and repayments are sometimes missing, we also 
compute net change in long term debt as the yearly difference in long term debt 
normalized by lagged PPE.
In most of the regression analysis, we use initial characteristics of firms to control 
for the potential heterogeneity among our 2,792 firms. These controls, measured in 
1993, are Return on Assets (operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT 
item No. 13) minus depreciation (COMPUSTAT item No. 14) divided by Assets 
(COMPUSTAT item No. 6)), Assets, Age measured as number of years since IPO, 
two-digit SIC codes and state of headquarters’ location.
Finally, to ensure that our results are statistically robust, all variables defined as 
ratios are windsorized using as thresholds the median plus/minus five times the 
interquartile range.10 Table 1 provides summary statistics on most accounting vari-
ables used in the article. We simply remark that the debt-related variables (Debt 
Repayment, Debt Issues, Net Debt Issues and Changes in Current Debt) have high 
means (0.48 for debt issues, for instance) but fairly low medians (e.g., 0.01 for debt 
issues). This is because (i) these variables are normalized by lagged PPE, which is 
notably smaller than total assets, and (ii) these variables are left censored so that 
they are naturally right skewed and as a consequence, even after windsorizing, there 
is still an important mass on the right tail of these distributions.
Ex Ante Measure of Credit Constraint.—The standard empirical approach in the 
investment literature uses ex ante measures of financial constraint to sort between 
“Constrained” and “Unconstrained” firms. Estimations are performed separately 
for each set of firms. We follow Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) in this 
approach and define three measures of credit constraint using the following schemes:
9 This normalization by PPE is standard in the investment literature (see, e.g., Kaplan and Zingales 1997 or Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach 2004). It provides typically a median investment ratio of 0.21. An alternative specification is 
to normalize all variables by lagged asset value (item No. 6), as in Rauh (2006) for instance, which delivers notably 
lower ratios.
10 The debt-related variables (Debt Repayment, Debt Issues, Net Debt Issues and Changes in Current Debt) have 
to be windsorized using the fifth /ninety-fifth percentiles as thresholds as the interquartile range for these variables 
is close to 0. Our results are unchanged if we use this 5 percent windsorizing methods for all variables.
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•	 Payout	 ratio:	 In	every	year	over	 the	1993–2007	period,	we	 rank	firms	based	
on their payout ratio and assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) 
group those firms in the bottom (top) three deciles of the annual payout 
 distribution. We compute the payout ratio as the ratio of total distributions 
(dividends (COMPUSTAT item No. 21) plus stock repurchases (COMPUSTAT 
item No. 115 )) to operating income (COMPUSTAT item No. 20).
•	 Firm	Size:	In	every	year	over	the	1993–2007	period,	we	rank	firms	based	on	
their total assets and assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group 
those firms in the bottom (top) three deciles of the annual asset size distribution.
•	 Bond	Rating:	 In	 every	year	 over	 the	1993–2007	period,	we	 retrieve	data	 on	
bond ratings assigned by Standard and Poor’s (COMPUSTAT item No. 280) 
and categorize those firms with long term debt outstanding but without a bond 
rating as financially constrained. Financially unconstrained firms are those 
whose bonds are rated.
B. Real Estate Data
Real Estate Prices.—We use data on residential and commercial real estate prices, 
both at the state and at the MSA level.
Residential real estate prices come from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight.11,12 The OFHEO provides a Home Price Index (HPI), which is a broad 
measure of the movement of single-family home prices in the United States.13 
Because of the breadth of the sample, it provides more information than is available 
in other house price indices. In particular, the HPI is available at the state level since 
1975. It is also available for most Metropolitan Statistical Areas, with a starting 
date between 1977 and 1987 depending on the MSA considered. We match the state 
level HPI with our accounting data using the state identifier from COMPUSTAT. To 
match the MSA level HPI, we aggregate Federal Information Processing Standards 
codes from COMPUSTAT into MSA identifiers using a correspondence table avail-
able from the OFHEO website.
Commercial real estate prices come from Global Real Analytics. This dataset pro-
vides a price index for Offices and Industrial Commercial Real Estate. This index 
is only available for a subset of 64 MSAs in the United States with a starting date 
between 1985 and 2003.
Table 1 provides details on these indices (that have been normalized to 1 in 2006). 
The correlation between the residential and commercial indices at the state level is 
0.57, and 0.42 at the MSA level. The correlation between the two residential indices 
is 0.86.
11 http:\\www.ofheo.gov/index.asp.
12 The OFHEO is an independent entity within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, whose 
primary mission is “ensuring the capital adequacy and financial safety and soundness of two government-spon-
sored enterprises (GSEs)–the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).”
13 The HPI is computed using a hedonic regression, and each release of the HPI offers a different value of the index 
for a given state year. This article uses the 2007 release, but results are virtually similar if using the 2008 release.
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Measuring Land Supply.—Controlling for the potential endogeneity of local 
real estate prices in an investment regression is an important step in our analysis. 
Following Himmelberg, Mayer, and Weisbach (2005), we instrument local real 
estate prices using the interaction of long-term interest rates and local housing 
 supply elasticity. Local housing supply elasticities are provided by Saiz (2010) and 
are available for 95 MSAs. These elasticities capture the amount of developable land 
in each metro area and are estimated by processing satellite-generated data on eleva-
tion and presence of water bodies. As a measure of long-term interest rates, we use 
the “contract rate on 30-year, fixed rate conventional home mortgage commitments” 
from the Federal Reserve website, between 1993 and 2007.
C. Measurement Issues
The empirical methodology we use in this paper relies on several approximations 
that introduce measurement errors in the regression analysis. In this section, we 
present evidence in support of these approximations.
The first approximation we make relates to the location of firms’ real estate 
assets. We assume that firms own most of their real estate assets in the state (or 
MSA) where their headquarters are located. We do so because there is no systematic 
source of information on corporations’ “true” location(s). To check the validity of 
this approximation, we collected manually information on the ownership status of 
a firm’s headquarter from the 10K forms filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission for the year 1997.14 These documents were retrieved from the SEC’s 
EDGAR website (http:\\www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml). Information on a firm’s head-
quarters ownership was available for 4,065 firms in 1997.15 Of those firms, 3,393 
firms also have nonmissing information on the value of their real estate assets in 
COMPUSTAT.
Table 2 presents some simple summary statistics for those 3,393 firms. Of the 
1,578 firms that report owning no real estate assets in COMPUSTAT in 1997, only 
33 firms (2 percent) report owning their headquarters in their 10K forms. The extent 
of measurement errors from using balance sheet data to assess firms’ real estate 
holdings seems limited.
On the other hand, of the 1,815 firms that report owning some real estate assets in 
COMPUSTAT, only 806 (44 percent) actually report owning their headquarters in 
their 10K forms.16 This suggests that our assumption that all of the real estate assets 
of a firm are located in its headquarters’ state (or MSA) is conservative. If not all of 
a firm’s real estate assets are located in its headquarters state or MSA, we will tend 
to overestimate the fraction of the value of its real estate that comoves with the prices 
14 1997 is the earliest date for which 10K forms are available. We also collected the same information for the year 
2000, which we use in our study of the real estate bubble of the early 2000s in Section IIG.
15 Four thousand, one hundred twenty-one firms reported in their 10K files a single headquarters. In addition, 
171 firms reported two distinct headquarters, and 19 reported three or more headquarters. These cases of multiple 
headquarters seem to typically correspond to small firms that have both their headquarters in either a small city, or in 
the suburb of a large city and, in addition, have an address in a large city that they use primarily as a mailing address 
(in some of those 183 cases, we could explicitly identify the address for the second headquarters as a PO box). We 
dropped those few observations with multiple headquarters.
16 Note that a firm may not own its headquarters but may still own other real estate assets in its headquarters 
state or MSA.
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in its headquarters state or MSA, and we will therefore underestimate the impact of 
a firm’s collateral on its investment. To gauge the importance of this assumption, we 
also run regressions using as explanatory variable a dummy for whether a firm owns 
its headquarters (based on 10K files information) instead of using the actual value of 
a firm’s real estate assets. We find that the economic significance of our coefficient 
of interest is similar to that found when using the information on the entire value of 
real estate assets from COMPUSTAT.
Second, using the OFHEO residential real estate prices as a proxy for commer-
cial real estate prices could be a source of noise in our regression. As noted earlier, 
the correlation between the two indices ranges from 0.42 (at the MSA level) to 
0.57 (at the state level). Moreover, the commercial index is available only at the 
MSA level, and for a subset of cities. Therefore, there is a trade-off: this index 
corresponds more accurately to the true nature of firms’ real estate assets, but it 
relies on the stronger assumption that these assets are mostly located in the city 
where headquarters are located. We present evidence using both series of prices 
(residential and commercial) and show that our results do not depend on the price 
index used.
II. Real Estate Prices and Firm Behavior
In this section we analyze the impact of real estate shocks on corporate invest-
ment. Our goal is to provide an estimate of the financial multiplier (i.e., by how 
much an increase in assets’ value increases investment) at the firm level.
A. Empirical Strategy
We run different specifications of a standard investment equation. Specifically, for 
firm i, at date t, with headquarters in location l (state or MSA), investment is given by
(1) IN V it l = αi + δt + β ∙ RE Valueit + γ  P t l + controlsit + ϵit ,
where INV is the ratio of investment to lagged PPE, RE Valueit is the ratio of the mar-
ket value of real estate assets in year t to lagged PPE, and  P t 
l controls for the level of 
prices in location l (state or MSA) in year t.
Table 2—10K Headquarter Ownership and COMPUSTAT Real Estate Ownership
No HQ ownership in 10K HQ ownership in 10K
No RE in COMPUSTAT 1,545 33
> 0 RE in COMPUSTAT 1,009 806
Notes: This table presents the cross-tabulation of headquarter ownership in the 1997 10K 
file and real estate ownership in COMPUSTAT for COMPUSTAT firms in 1997. “> 0 RE in 
COMPUSTAT” means that the firm reports some real estate ownership in COMPUSTAT in 
1997, and “No RE in COMPUSTAT” means that the firm reports no real estate assets in 1997 
in COMPUSTAT. “No HQ ownership in 10K” means that the firm reports that it leases its 
headquarter(s) in its 1997 10K file. “HQ ownership in 10K” means that the firm reports that it 
owns its headquarter(s) in its 1997 10K file.
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The interpretation of this reduced form equation is based on a simple model of 
investment under collateral constraint.17 In the presence of financing constraints, at 
least a fraction of firms will use their pledgeable assets as collateral to finance their 
investment. A constrained firm will borrow a fraction the collateral value of all its 
pledgeable assets. Conditional on not defaulting on its debt at the end of a period, a 
firm will repay its debt and then use its collateral again to finance investment in the 
subsequent period. This model justifies our choice of regressing the annual invest-
ment of a firm on the current market value of its entire stock of real estate assets. 
The coefficient  ˆ  
 β is a composite measure of the fraction of firms in the sample that 
face financing constraints, the severity of these financing constraints, and the frac-
tion of the value of real estate assets that can be used as collateral. If some firms face 
financing constraints, the coefficient  ˆ  
 β will be positive. In a reduced form, this coef-
ficient  ˆ  
 β measures, for the average firm in the sample, the fraction of its collateral 
that can be used to finance investment.
Following the guidance of the theory, and as is typically done in the reduced-
form investment literature, we control for the ratio of cash flows to PPE and the 
one year lagged market to book value of assets. The theory predicts that while 
the reduced form coefficient  ˆ  
 β should be larger in the absence of a control for 
the market value of the firm, it should still be positive provided there is a suf-
ficient fraction of constrained firms in the sample.18 We also include a firm fixed 
effect αi , as well as year fixed effects δt , designed to capture aggregate specific 
investment shocks, i.e., fluctuations in the global economy. Finally, the variable 
P t 
l controls for the overall impact of the real estate cycle on investment, irrespec-
tive of whether a firm owns real estate or not. Shocks ϵit are clustered at the State/
MSA × year level. This correlation structure is conservative given that the explan-
atory variable of interest RE Valueit is defined at the firm level (see Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
As noted in Section IA, the market value of the entire real estate portfolio of a firm 
can be estimated only before 1993, which is the last year for which accumulated 
depreciations on buildings are available. RE Valuei1993 is thus defined as the initial 
market value of a firm’s real estate assets, and subsequent variations in RE Valueit 
capture fluctuations in the market values of these specific assets.19
Let us also highlight that the coefficient β measures how a firm’s investment 
responds to each additional $1 of real estate the firm actually owns, and not how 
investment responds to real estate shocks overall. This specification allows us to 
abstract from state-specific shocks that would affect firms both with and without 
real estate assets.
17 In the working paper version Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009), we develop a simple model of investment 
under collateral constraint to justify this specification.
18 Formally, if the estimated coefficient  ˆ  
 β is positive after controlling for the market value of a firm, we can reject 
the assumption that firms do not face any financing constraint, while if the estimated coefficient  ˆ  
 β is negative, we 
cannot reject this assumption.
19 Using only the initial value of real estate in 1993 offers an additional advantage: if a firm discovers a profitable 
investment opportunity, and if it leases some of its real estate, we may expect that its landlord will try to extract as 
much rent as possible from this future investment; to escape from this hold-up problem, we may expect this firm to 
become owner of its real estate exactly when it is about to invest; in such a scenario, we would then see a spurious 
correlation between the current value of the real estate a firm owns and its investment. We circumvent this problem 
by using variations in the value of real estate that come only from market prices, and not from the contemporaneous 
strategy of the firm.
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Endogeneity Issues.—There are two potential sources of endogeneity in the estima-
tion of equation 1: (i) real estate prices could be correlated with investment opportuni-
ties and (ii) the ownership decision could be related with investment opportunities.
There are two immediate reasons why real estate prices could be correlated with 
investment opportunities. The first one is a simple reverse causality argument: large 
firms might have a nonnegligible impact through the demand for local labor and 
locally produced intermediates on the local activity, so that an increase in invest-
ment for such large land-holding firms could trigger a real estate price appreciation. 
This would lead us to overestimate β. Second, it could be that our measure of real 
estate prices proxies for local demand shocks, and that land-holding firms are more 
sensitive to local demand.
To address this source of endogeneity, we instrument MSA-level real estate 
prices. As already mentioned in Section IB, and following Himmelberg, Mayer, 
and Sinai (2005) and Mian and Sufi (2011), we do so by interacting local housing 
elasticities with aggregate shifts in the interest rate. When interest rates decrease, 
the demand for real estate increases. If the local supply of land is very elastic, 
the increased demand will translate mostly into more construction (more quan-
tity) rather than higher land prices. If the supply of land is very inelastic on the 
other hand, the increased demand will translate mostly into higher prices rather 
than more construction. We expect that in MSAs where land supply is more con-
strained, a drop in interest rate should have a larger impact on real estate prices 
(our first-stage regression). We thus estimate, for MSA l, at date t, the following 
equation predicting real estate prices  P t 
l:
(2)  P t l = α l + δt + γ · Elasticity l × IRt +  u t l ,
where Elasticity measures constraints on land supply at the MSA level, IR is the 
nationwide real interest rate at which banks refinance their home loans, α l is an 
MSA fixed effect, and δt captures macroeconomic fluctuations in real estate prices, 
from which we want to abstract. The results of this first-stage regression are pre-
sented in Table 3.
To further address this concern, we verify in Section IIC that our results are robust 
to restricting our sample of firms to small firms in large cities. In those cases, we 
do not expect any individual firm to have a sizable impact on local real estate prices 
through a general equilibrium feedback.
The second source of endogeneity in the estimation of equation 1 comes from 
the ownership decision: if firms that are more likely to own real estate are also 
more sensitive to local demand shocks, we would overestimate β. As a first step in 
addressing this issue, we control for initial characteristics of firm i, Xi , interacted 
with real estate prices  P t 
m . If those controls identify characteristics that make firm 
i more likely to own real estate, and if those characteristics also make firm i more 
sensitive to fluctuations in real estate prices, controlling for the interaction between 
those controls and the contemporaneous real estate prices allows us to separately 
identify the collateral channel we are interested in.
The Xi are controls that we believe might play an important role in the ownership 
decision and include five quintiles of Age, Assets, and Return on Assets as well 
as two-digit industry dummies and State dummies. We show in Table 4 that these 
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 characteristics are good predictors of the decision to buy real estate assets and, to 
a lesser extent, on the amount of real estate purchased. Table 4 is a simple cross-
sectional OLS regression of RE OWNER, a dummy equal to 1 when the firm owns 
real estate, and RE Value, the market value of the firm’s real estate assets, on the 
initial characteristics mentioned above. Older, larger, and more profitable firms, i.e., 
mature firms, are more likely to be owners in our dataset.20
Controlling for the observed determinants of real estate ownership, we estimate 
the following reduced form investment equation:
(3) IN V it l = αi + δt + β ∙ RE Valueit + γ  P t l +  ∑ 
k
 
 
 κ k ∙  X k i 
 ×  P t l + controlsit + ϵit .
However, some determinants of the land-holding decisions might not be observ-
able, which makes our approach in equation (3) insufficient. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to find firm-level instruments that predict real estate ownership. Yet, we can 
still attempt to empirically measure how different land-holding firms are compared 
to non–land-holding firms. To do so, we look in Section IIF at the sensitivity of 
investment to real estate prices for firms that are about to purchase a property, but 
20 Note that, from an intuitive perspective, these firms seem to be more likely to be insulated from local demand 
shocks. This suggests that the hypothesis according to which land-holding firms are inherently more likely to be 
affected by local demand shocks is not the most likely a priori.
Table 3—First-Stage Regression: The Impact of Local Housing Supply Elasticity on Housing Prices
MSA Residential Prices MSA Office Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local housing supply elasticity mortgage rate 0.028*** 0.036***
(6.3) (5)
First quartile of elasticity mortgage rate −0.064*** −0.066***
(−8.9) (−5.1)
Second quartile of elasticity mortgage rate −0.046*** −0.033**
(−6) (−2)
Third quartile of elasticity mortgage rate −0.014** −0.0097
(−2.2) (−0.41)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,358 1,358 804 804
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.94 0.84 0.84
Notes: This table investigates how local housing supply elasticity, as defined by Saiz (2009), affects real estate 
prices. The dependent variable is the real estate price index, defined at the MSA level—columns 1 and 2—and the 
MSA office price index—columns 3 and 4. Columns 1 and 3 use directly the local housing supply elasticity, while 
columns 2 and 4 use quartiles of the elasticity. All regressions control for year as well as MSA fixed effects and 
cluster observations at the MSA level. T-stats in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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before the purchase. If the unobserved characteristics that codetermine investment 
and ownership are time invariant, then it should be the case that firms that are about 
to purchase real estate assets are already more sensitive to the real estate cycle. 
Section IIF shows that this is not the case and describes the implementation of this 
test in greater detail. We insist, however, that while suggestive, this approach is by 
no means definitive, as the unobserved heterogeneity could well vary with time.
B. Main Results
Table 5 reports estimates of various specifications of equations (1) and 
(3). Column 1 starts with the simplest estimation of equation (1) without any 
additional controls. Land-holding firms increase their investment more than 
Table 4—Determinants of Real Estate Ownership
RE OWNER RE Value (state)
(1) (2)
2nd quintile of asset 0.16*** 0.12*
(7.5) (1.8)
3rd quintile of asset 0.32*** 0.17**
(14) (2.5)
4th quintile of asset 0.49*** 0.33***
(20) (4.4)
5th quintile of asset 0.51*** 0.11
(18) (1.3)
2nd quintile of ROA 0.13*** 0.4***
(5.6) (5.8)
3rd quintile of ROA 0.14*** 0.25***
(6) (3.5)
4th quintile of ROA 0.14*** 0.21***
(5.8) (3)
5th quintile of ROA 0.12*** 0.23***
(5.3) (3.3)
2nd quintile of age 0.045** 0.017
(2) (0.25)
3rd quintile of age 0.12*** 0.13**
(6) (2.2)
4th quintile of age 0.24*** 0.5***
(11) (7.7)
5th quintile of age 0.26*** 0.92***
(11) (13)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes
State fixed effect Yes Yes
Observations 2,782 2,782
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.24
Notes: This table shows the determinant of Real Estate Ownership in 1993. The dependent 
variable is RE OWNER (column 1), a dummy indicating whether the firm reports any real 
estate asset on its balance sheet in 1993 and RE Value (column 2), the market value of real 
estate assets in 1993. Control variables include five quintiles of Asset, Age, ROA, as well as 
Industry and State fixed effects. T-stats in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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non–land-holding firms when real estate prices increase. The baseline coefficient 
is 0.074, so that each additional $1 of real estate collateral increases investment by 
$0.074. The coefficient is significant at the 1 percent confidence level. The effect 
is economically large: a one–standard deviation increase in RE Value increases 
investment by 26 percent of investment’s standard deviation.21
In column 2, we add the initial controls interacted with real estate prices that 
account for the observed heterogeneity in ownership decisions and its potential 
impact on the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices. The coefficient is now 
21 Increasing RE Value by one standard deviation (1.36) increases INV by 0.074 × 1.36 = 0.10, which represents 
26 percent of investment’s standard deviation (0.4).
Table 5—Real Estate Prices and Investment Behavior
Capital expenditure
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RE Value (State Res. Prices) 0.074*** 0.065*** 0.052***
(15) (13) (11)
RE Value (MSA Res. Prices) 0.053***
(11)
RE Value (MSA O. Prices) 0.06*** 0.062***
(8.9) (5.5)
RE OWNER × MSA O. Prices 0.21*** 0.44***
(3.3) (2.75)
State Res. Prices −0.11* −0.91** −0.46
(−1.8) (−2) (−1.2)
MSA Res. Prices −0.58
(−1.3)
MSA O. Prices 0.25 0.22 0.062 0.2
(0.27) (0.09) (0.065) (0.075)
Cash 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(8.4) (8.9) (7.5) (3.8) (7.5) (4.4)
Market/Book 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.07*** 0.072*** 0.071***
(20) (20) (19) (10.1) (19) (11.3)
Init. Controls × State Res. Prices No Yes Yes No No No No No
Init. Controls × MSA Res. Prices No No No Yes No No No No
Init. Controls × MSA Off. Prices No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,201 27,026 24,167 22,894 17,805 17,586 18,031 17,731
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Notes: This table reports the empirical link between the value of real estate assets and investment. The dependent 
variable is capital expenditure (item No. 128 normalized by lagged item No. 8). Columns 1, 2, and 3 use the state-
level residential price index. Column 4 uses MSA-level residential prices, while columns 5, 6, and 7 use MSA-level 
office prices. Except for column 1, all regressions control for firm-level initial characteristics (five quintiles of age, 
asset, and ROA, as well as two-digit industry and state of location) interacted with Real Estate Prices. All regres-
sions, except columns 1 and 2, control for Cash and previous year Market/Book. Columns 6 and 8 present IV esti-
mates where MSA office prices are instrumented using the interaction of real mortgage rate interacted with the local 
elasticity of land supply taken from Saiz (2010) (see column 3 in Table 3 for the first-stage regressions). All specifi-
cations use year and firm fixed effects and cluster observations at the state-year or MSA-year level. In the IV speci-
fications in columns 6 and 8, standard errors are bootstrapped within MSA-year clusters. T-stats are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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0.065, still significant at the 1 percent confidence level, somewhat smaller but not 
statistically different from 0.074 found in column 1.
Column 3 adds state variables traditionally used in estimating investment equa-
tions, i.e., Cash and Market to Book. The reduced form sensitivity remains positive 
but is now smaller, equal to 0.052.22, 23 In other words, a one–standard deviation 
increase in collateral value explains an 18 percent standard deviation increase in 
investment once the effect of the Market to Book and the other controls are accounted 
for. Note that, as is traditional in the investment literature, both Cash and Market to 
Book have a significant, positive impact on investment.
Column 4 replicates the estimation performed in column 3 using the MSA-level 
residential price index instead of the state-level index. Using MSA level prices has 
both advantages and drawbacks. It offers a more precise source of variation in real 
estate prices. It also makes our identifying assumption that investment opportunities 
are uncorrelated with variations in local prices milder. However, there are poten-
tially larger measurement errors, as we now rely on the assumption that all the real 
estate assets that a firm owns are located in the headquarters’ city. The results in 
column 4 show that the coefficient remains stable, at 0.053.
Column 5 uses commercial real estate prices instead of residential prices. The 
lower number of MSAs with available commercial real estate prices reduces slightly 
the number of observations (22,894 observations compared to 24,167 in the speci-
fication using MSA residential prices). However, the sensitivity remains strongly 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level and is slightly higher than that com-
puted using residential prices: a $1 increase in the value of commercial real estate 
assets leads to an average increase of $0.06 in investment.
Column 6 implements the IV strategy where real estate prices are instrumented 
using the interaction of interest rates and local constraints on land supply (see 
Section IIA). Let us first briefly comment on the first-stage regressions, which are 
direct estimations of equation 2. These estimations are presented in Table 3. The 
first two columns predict MSA residential prices, while the two last columns predict 
MSA office prices. In columns 1 and 3, we directly use the measure of local housing 
supply elasticity provided in Saiz (2010). In columns 2 and 4, we group MSAs by 
quartile of local housing supply elasticity.
Low values of local housing supply elasticity correspond to MSAs with very con-
strained land supply. We expect the positive effect of declining interest rates on prices 
to be stronger in MSAs with less elastic supply. As expected, the γ coefficient in equa-
tion 2 is positive and significant at the 1 percent confidence level. For instance, using 
the results in column 4, a 100–basis points interest rate decline increases the office 
price index by 6.6 percentage points more in “constrained” cities (top quartile of the 
elasticity distribution) than in “unconstrained” cities (bottom quartile). These effects 
22 In particular, in unreported regressions, we see that most of the drop in the sensitivity comes from adding the 
control for the Market-to-Book ratio and not from adding Cash.
23 As we explain in our working paper (Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar 2009), the drop in β once the Market-to-
Book ratio is controlled for can easily be interpreted in the light of a simple model of investment with collateral 
constraints. Intuitively, to leave the Market-to-Book ratio unchanged after a positive shock to the value of the firm’s 
real estate assets, there needs to be a negative shock to unobserved productivity. This negative shock to productivity 
generates a negative shock to investment. As a consequence, the response of investment to the initial shock in real 
estate prices will be smaller than it would have been had the Market-to-Book ratio not been controlled for.
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are economically large, and significant. All F-tests for nullity of the instrument are 
above 10, which leads us to conclude that these instruments are not weak.
Moving to the second-stage equation, we simply use predicted prices  ˆ   P t 
l from the 
estimation of equation 2 as an explanatory variable in equation 3.24 Column 6 in 
Table 5 reports the result of the estimation when the instrument used in the first stage 
is the local housing supply elasticity (i.e., column 3 of Table 3). The coefficient 
estimated from this IV regression is very close to the one obtained from the OLS 
regression, equals to 0.062 and remains significant at the 1 percent level.
Column 7 tests whether the relation between collateral value and investment 
found in columns 1–5 depends on the shape of the empirical distribution of collat-
eral values. To do so, we interact the RE OWNER dummy (equal to 1 when a firm 
initially owns some real estate assets) with the real estate price index. The estimated 
coefficient is positive and strongly significant, indicating that our results are not 
driven by firms with large real estate holdings. Of course, the interpretation of the 
coefficient on this dummy specification (RE OWNER) is not directly comparable to 
the one with the continuous variable (RE Value). While the 0.06 coefficient in col-
umn 5 means that a $1 increase in the value of a firm’s real estate assets translates 
into a $0.06 increase in investment, the 0.21 coefficient in column 7 means that on 
average, for a unit increase in the local price index, a firm that owns at least some 
real estate increases its investment rate by 21 percentage points more than a firm that 
does not own real estate. The economic magnitude implied by this dummy speci-
fication is very similar to the specification that uses the value of real estate, as in 
column 5. A one–standard deviation increase in the interaction between the dummy 
RE OWNER and land prices (respectively, RE Value) increases investment by 21 
percent (respectively, 19 percent) of investments standard deviation.25
Column 8 implements the IV strategy on the dummy specification of column 7. In 
that specification, the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices for owners versus 
non-owners increases almost twofold, from 0.21 to 0.44. The associated standard 
error also increases significantly, but the estimated coefficient remains significant at 
the 1 percent confidence level.
C. Robustness Checks
Table 6 provides various robustness checks of the baseline estimation of equation 
(3) in column 5 of Table 5.
24 Because we construct our set of predicted prices on a different sample than the sample over which we run our 
investment regression, we need to adjust our standard errors to account for this predicted regressor. In all our IV 
specification, we thus report bootstrapped t-stats. The bootstrap has been done as follows: we first draw a random 
sample with replacement within the sample of MSA-years; we run the first-stage regression on this sample; we 
then draw another random sample with replacement within the sample of firm-years; to correct for the correlation 
structure of this sample (MSA-year), this random draw is made at the MSA-year level, and not at the firm-year 
level (i.e., we randomly draw with replacement a MSA-year and then select all the firms within this MSA-year); we 
finally run our second-stage regression on this sample. We repeat this procedure 500 times, and the standard error 
we report corresponds to the empirical distribution of the coefficients estimated.
25 The coefficient β for the dummy specification in column 7 is 0.21, and one standard deviation of the right-hand 
side variable RE Owner × MSA office prices is 0.39, so that 0.21 × 0.39 ≈ 0.082 represents 20.5 percent of invest-
ment’s standard deviation. (0.40). The coefficient β for the comparable continuous specification in column 5 is 0.06, 
and one standard deviation of the RHS variable RE Value is 1.27, so that 0.06 × 1.27 ≈ 0.076 represents 19 percent of 
investment’s standard deviation (0.40).
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Columns 1 and 2 reproduce the estimation on two different subsample periods: 
before 1999 in column 1, and after 2000 in column 2. A potential issue with pooled 
regressions as the ones presented in Table 5 is that they might conceal a fair amount 
of heterogeneity in the elasticity over time. For instance, the sensitivity of investment 
may be different in a growing environment than in a recession. We cannot report 
yearly estimates, but we reproduce the estimation of equation (3) on two different 
subperiods, 1993–2000 and 2000–2007. The estimated coefficients are significant in 
both subperiods. The estimated coefficient β is only marginally higher before 1999 
than after 2000 (0.08 versus 0.078), and not statistically different. Neither the sig-
nificance nor the magnitude of the coefficient of interest seems to come from some 
particular years in our sample.
Column 3 estimates equation 3 on a subsample of small firms in large MSAs. 
This specification addresses the concern of reverse causality, whereby a large firm’s 
investment may increase local real estate prices. We consider only firms in the lower 
three quartiles of size, and in the largest 20 MSAs. The estimated coefficient remains 
significant at the 1 percent confidence level and is only marginally smaller than, but 
not statistically different from, the coefficient estimated on the entire sample (0.058 
compared to 0.06).
Table 6—Real Estate Prices and Investment Behavior: Robustness Checks
Before After
Large
MSAs Δ(PPE) −
3-years
 mean Ind. − adj. Unrestricted 10K
1999 2000 small firms Δ(RE) capex capex sample info
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RE Value 0.08*** 0.078*** 0.058*** 0.03*** 0.088*** 0.061***
 (MSA O. Prices) (6.1) (5.6) (5.7) (4.1) (12) (9.2)
RE OWNER × 0.23*** 0.17***
 MSA O. Prices (2.9) (3.2)
MSA O. Prices −1.1 0.81 0.12 −0.56 −0.72 0.33 0.99 2.9
(−0.98) (1) (0.21) (−0.58) (−0.36) (0.37) (0.66) (1.6)
Cash 0.029*** 0.02*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.042*** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(5.5) (3.6) (4.7) (6.8) (12) (7.3) (5.5) (5.1)
Market/Book 0.079*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.087*** 0.069***
(15) (8.5) (12) (18) (17) (18) (25) (21)
Init. controls × 
 MSA O. Prices
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,440 6,365 9,282 15,691 14,384 17,782 19,886 17,558
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.32 0.28 0.19 0.49 0.27 0.33 0.28
Notes: This table tests the robustness of the link between the value of real estate assets and investment. The baseline 
regression is column 5 of Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 report regression results for two subperiods: 1993–1999 (col-
umn 1) and 2000–2007 (column 2). Column 3 restricts the sample to firms in the bottom three quartiles of size and 
in the top 20 MSAs. Column 4 uses as a dependent variable variations in PPE minus variations in real estate assets 
normalized by lagged PPE. Column 5 uses as dependent variable the average capital expenditure over the next three 
years normalized by lagged PPE. Column 6 uses capital expenditure minus the yearly average capital expenditure 
in the industry normalized by lagged PPE as a dependent variable. Column 7 uses the dummy variable specification 
of column 7 in Table 5, but does not restrict the sample to firms present in 1993. Column 8 also uses the dummy 
variable specification of column 8 in Table 5 but uses headquarter ownership information as reported in the firm’s 
10K file. All regressions use MSA-level office prices, year and firm fixed effect, control for Cash, previous year 
Market/Book ratio, and initial controls interacted with MSA-level office prices. Standard errors are clustered at the 
MSA-year level. T-stats are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Column 4 uses as a dependent variable variations in PPE net of variations in real 
estate assets. One possible concern may be that investment includes investment in 
real estate assets. If a firm were to systematically acquire real estate assets when real 
estate prices increase, and all the more so if that firm already owns more real estate, 
one would mechanically find a positive and significant β coefficient.26 Removing 
any acquisition or sales of real estate from investment addresses this concern. The 
estimated coefficient remains large and significant at the 1 percent level.27
Column 5 uses as a dependent variable the average investment over the subse-
quent three years, and not the investment over a single year. One may expect that in 
the presence of collateral constraints, the renegotiation of debt contract with lenders 
following an appreciation of a firm’s real estate may be gradual. As expected, the 
coefficient increases from $0.06 to $0.088, implying that each additional $1 of col-
lateral leads to an average increase in yearly investment of 8.8 cents over the next 
three following years. This coefficient is directly comparable to Gan (2007), who 
also uses the average investment over the subsequent three years as a dependent 
variable. She finds an 0.8 percentage point decrease in investment for a 10 percent 
drop in real estate value while the corresponding figure in our setting is 0.88.28
Column 6 uses as dependent variable the investment of firm i adjusted for the 
overall investment of firms in i ’s two-digit SIC code. Such a specification addresses 
the concern that investment may be concentrated in specific sectors where firms tend 
to own their real estate, and that those sectors may have been concentrated in areas 
that experienced large real estate price inflation. The coefficient of interest remains 
unchanged at $0.061 of investment per $1 of collateral and remains significant at 
the 1 percent level.
Column 7 uses the entire sample of firms, without restricting our attention to 
firms that were present in our sample in 1993. This specification addresses the pos-
sible concern that selection and survivorship bias may lead to biased estimates. Of 
course, as explained in Section IA, the information on the accumulated depreciation 
on buildings that we use to construct the market value of real estate assets is not 
available beyond 1993. For firms that enter our dataset after 1993, we know only 
the book value of their real estate assets but cannot infer their market value. We 
therefore estimate the dummy specification of equation 3. The results of this regres-
sion in column 7 of Table 6 are to be compared to the similar regression in column 
7 of Table 5. The coefficient of interest is unchanged (0.23 compared to 0.21) and 
remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level in this unrestricted sample.
Column 8 uses the information on whether a firm actually owns its headquarters 
directly from the 10K files for the year 1997.29 The collection of this data is described 
in Section IC. Unfortunately, the 10K files do not provide us with information on the 
value of a firm’s real estate, but only on whether a firm owns its  headquarters or not. 
26 In unreported regressions, we verify directly that firms do not seem to follow such a strategy for their acquisi-
tion of real estate.
27 Note that yearly variations in PPE are not directly comparable to investment, as they do not account for the 
depreciation of physical capital. We use as a dependent variable the difference between changes in PPE and changes 
in real estate assets, which are comparable to each other. This further addresses the concern that the value of differ-
ent types of assets may be reevaluated differently.
28 Gan (2007) measures the response of the average investment over the period 1994 –1998 to the collapse in 
land prices in 1989.
29 10K files become available only in 1997.
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We therefore estimate the same dummy specification of equation (3) as in column 7 
of Table 5 or column 7 of Table 6. The coefficient of interest drops somewhat from 
0.23 to 0.17, but it remains significant at the 1 percent level.
Finally, we also estimated all the regressions presented in Table 6 implement-
ing the IV strategy where real estate prices are instrumented on the interaction of 
interest rates and local constraints on land supply (see Section IIA). The results are 
essentially unchanged.30
D. Heterogeneous Responses: Ex Ante Credit Constraints
As pointed out in a different context by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), it is unclear 
a priori that the sensitivity of investment to collateral value should be increasing 
with the extent of credit constraints. This remains ultimately an empirical question, 
which we answer using three different ex ante measures of credit constraints based 
on: (i) dividend payments (ii) firm size and (iii) credit rating. Those measures are 
defined in Section IA. We estimate equation (3) separately for “constrained” and 
“unconstrained” firms.
As reported in Table 7, there is a strong cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
response of investment to balance sheet shocks. The sensitivity of investment to col-
lateral value is on average twice as large in the group of “constrained” firms relative 
to the group of “unconstrained” firms. For instance, the coefficient β for firms in the 
bottom 3 deciles of the size distribution is 0.091 compared to 0.042 for the firms in 
the top 3 deciles. The difference between these two coefficients is significant at the 
1 percent level for all three measures of credit constraints.
Here again, the results are similar when instrumenting real estate prices using the 
interaction of interest rates and local constraints on land supply.31
E. Collateral and Debt
In this section, we try to explore the channel through which firms are able to convert 
capital gains on real estate assets into further investment. In unreported regressions, 
we investigate whether firms, when confronted with an increase in the value of their 
real estate assets, are more likely to sell them and cash out the capital gains. We do 
not find it to be the case. This implies that outside financing has to increase to explain 
the observed increase in investment. Standard theories of investment with collateral 
constraints (as, e.g., in Hart and Moore 1994) would predict that collateral value leads 
to more or larger issues of new debt, secured on the appreciated value of land holdings.
Table 8 reports results of the effect of an increase in land value on debt issues, 
using COMPUSTAT data. To simplify interpretation, we remove the Cash and 
Market/Book controls from equation (3) and replace investment on the right-hand 
side with debt issues and debt repayments:
(4) DebtIssu es it l = α i +  δ t l + β ∙ RE Valueit +  ϵ it l .
30 The results from the IV estimations are available from the authors upon request.
31 The results from the IV estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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To obtain estimates comparable to investment results, our debt issues variables 
are normalized by lagged tangible fixed assets (PPE). Thus, the results obtained 
when estimating equation (4) should be compared with the coefficient β derived in 
column 2 of Table 5, i.e., 0.067.
The results are presented in Table 8. Columns 1 and 2 look at the inflows and 
outflows of debt. We find that land-holding firms make larger debt issuances and 
repayments when the value of their real estate increases. A $1 increase in collat-
eral value increases debt issues by $0.095 and debt repayments by $0.05. The dif-
ference between the two, i.e., net debt issues as presented in column 3, increases 
by $0.032, in a range similar to the observed increase in investment. The fact 
that both repayment and issues increase when collateral value increases suggests 
that firms take advantage of the appreciated value of their collateral to renego-
tiate former debt contracts, reimbursing former loans and issuing new, cheaper 
ones. If this were the case, the marginal interest rates of companies with increas-
ing collateral value should decrease. Unfortunately, COMPUSTAT reports only 
a noisy measure of average interest rates, preventing us from testing this natu-
ral interpretation of the results. Doing so would require the use of an alternative 
source of data. A potential worry with results in columns 1 to 3 is that flows data 
(i.e., issuances and repayments) are of a lower quality than stock data (i.e., the 
level of long-term debt). Column 4 confirms the robustness of these results by 
Table 7—Real Estate Prices and Investment Behavior: “Constrained” versus “Unconstrained” Firms
Capital expenditure
Payout policy Firm size Bond ratings
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
RE Value 0.084*** 0.043*** 0.091*** 0.042*** 0.073*** 0.03***
 (MSA Office Prices) (7.2) (4.1) (6.1) (4.4) (7.2) (3.6)
(7) (4.3) (5.9) (4.6) (7.2) (3.7)
MSA Office Prices −0.22 0.18 −6.2 −0.51 −0.14 −1.9
(−0.084) (0.16) (−0.71) (−0.51) (−0.087) (−1)
Cash 0.02*** 0.055*** 0.014*** 0.08*** 0.026*** 0.055***
(4.5) (6.1) (2.7) (5.7) (5) (3.2)
Market/Book 0.069*** 0.06*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.075*** 0.064***
(13) (8.3) (11) (7.4) (13) (5.8)
Initial controls × 
 MSA Office Prices
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test “Const. = Unconst.” 3.16*** 3.01*** 3.14***
Observations 8,879 6,090 5,846 4,535 10,409 3,208
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.48 0.18 0.66 0.32 0.6
Notes: This table differentiates the results of column 5 in Table 5 according to ex ante measures of credit constraints. 
The dependent variable is capital expenditure (item No. 128 normalized by lagged item No. 8). RE Value (MSA 
Office Prices) is the market value of real estate assets normalized by lagged PPE. All regressions control for firm-
level initial characteristics (five quintiles of Age, Asset, and ROA as well as initial two-digit industry and state of 
location) interacted with Real Estate Prices, as well as for Cash and previous year Market/Book. Constraint cat-
egory assignments use ex ante criteria based on firm dividend payout (columns 1 and 2), size (columns 3 and 4), 
and bond ratings (columns 5 and 6). Test “Const. = Unconst.” is a t-test of equality of the RE Value coefficients 
between the constrained and the unconstrained firms. All specifications use year and firm fixed effect and cluster 
observations at the MSA-year level. T-stats in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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looking at yearly variations in the stock of long-term debt. The reported coeffi-
cient (0.044) is similar to that in column 3.
On the short-term liability side, lines of credits might be easier to obtain when 
secured on valuable collateral. However, we observe only a small, positive and 
slightly significant net increase in short term debts, with a coefficient of $0.0034 
per $1. Borrowers are more likely to use longer-term liabilities to finance their addi-
tional investment.
The results are similar when instrumenting real estate prices using the interaction 
of interest rates and local constraints on land supply.32
F. Are Real Estate Purchasers Different from Nonpurchasers?
The decision by firms to own real estate assets on their balance sheet is not ran-
dom. This can introduce a bias in the various regressions we have presented so far. 
For instance, if firms with more cyclical strategies were to own their real estate 
properties—for a reason we do not model here—the estimated β would be upward 
biased.
In this section, we show that our results are robust to assuming a time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms that would affect both the real estate ownership 
and the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices. Our test consists in estimating 
the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices for firms that purchase a property both 
before and after this acquisition. We find that, before the acquisition, future owners are 
32 The results from the IV estimations are available from the authors upon request.
Table 8—Real Estate Prices and Debt Issues
Debt Debt Net debt Changes in Changes in
issues repayment issues long-term debt current debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RE Value (MSA Office Prices) 0.095*** 0.05*** 0.032*** 0.044*** 0.0034
(5.5) (5) (3.5) (5.6) (1.2)
MSA Office Prices 3.1 2.5 0.12 0.048 0.56*
(0.94) (0.83) (0.23) (0.069) (2)
Initial controls × 
 MSA Office Prices
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,375 19,691 18,952 20,138 20,210
Adjusted R2 0.3 0.36 0.096 −0.0069 0.012
Notes: This table reports the relationship between collateral value and capital structure. The dependent variable is 
Debt Issues (column 1), Debt Repayment (column 2), Net Debt Issues (column 3), Changes in Long-Term Debt 
(column 4), and Changes in Current Debt (column 5). RE Value (MSA Office Prices) is the market value of real 
estate assets computed using MSA-level office prices normalized by lagged PPE. All regressions control for firm-
level initial characteristics (five quintiles of Age, Asset, and ROA as well as initial two-digit industry and state of 
location) interacted with Real Estate Prices. All specifications use year and firm fixed effect and cluster observations 
at the MSA-year level. T-stats are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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statistically indistinguishable from firms that never own real estate. Yet, these firms 
behave like other real-estate holding firms after they acquire their properties.
To implement this idea we do not rely on the market value of the real estate assets, 
but only on whether firms own real estate or not. This allows us to work with a larger 
sample, as we do not require information on buildings depreciations. These results 
are to be compared to the dummy specification presented in column 7 of Table 5.
We start with a sample of all COMPUSTAT firms that are not in the Finance, 
Insurance, Real Estate, Construction, or Mining Industries, that are not involved in 
major takeovers, and that have at least three consecutive years of appearance in the 
data. The sample period is 1984 to 2007, 1984 being the year when information on 
real estate assets starts being available in COMPUSTAT. We define a firm as a pur-
chaser if it has initially no positive real estate assets on its balance sheet and strictly 
positive real estate assets after some date. When a firm moves more than once between 
0 and positive real estate assets, we retain only the first acquisition in our sample). We 
require that the firm has at least two years of available data before and after the pur-
chase of the real estate asset to be included in the sample. We end up with a sample of 
367 purchasers and 4,136 purchaser-year observations, with purchasing date ranging 
from 1986 to 2005. The number of purchaser-year observations before the purchase is 
2,144. The group of nonpurchasers is defined as those firms that report no real estate 
assets from 1984 to 2007 in COMPUSTAT. This leaves us with a sample of 2,751 
firms and 16,011 firm-year observations for nonpurchaser.
We first estimate equation (1) separately for nonpurchasers and for purchasers 
before the purchase of land. The results are presented in Table 9, columns 1 and 2. 
If anything, purchasers have, prior to acquiring real estate, a lower sensitivity of 
investment to real estate prices than nonpurchasers. More importantly, neither sen-
sitivities nor the difference between these two sensitivities are statistically different 
from 0. Future owners are statistically indistinguishable from non-owners before 
they acquire land. The data reject the existence of a time-invariant unobserved het-
erogeneity that would simultaneously affect real estate ownership and investment 
sensitivity to the local real estate cycle. However, we emphasize again that this does 
not imply that the decision to own land is exogenous: firms could decide to buy real 
estate anticipating that their investment opportunities will be more correlated with 
the local real estate cycle, creating a bias in the estimation.
The sample of purchasers also allows us to confirm the findings in Section IIB by 
investigating the within dimension of the data. In order to do so, we also estimate 
equation (1) for purchasers after they acquire real estate assets. The results are pre-
sented in column 3 of Table 9. The sensitivity of investment to real estate prices is 
0.38 for purchasers once they become land holders, and it is significant at the 5 per-
cent level. Relative to column 2, we see that purchasing real estate is associated with 
a 0.64 increase in the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices. This difference 
is significant at the 2 percent level. This difference between owners and  non-owners 
is larger but not statistically different from the comparable coefficient (0.21) in col-
umn 7 of Table 5.33
33 As the estimation corresponds to a specification with a RE OWNER dummy variable, the natural benchmark 
is that of column 7 in Table 5.
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Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 9 run the same regressions as in columns 1, 2, and 
3 using variations in long-term debt as a dependent variable. The sensitivity of debt 
issues to local real estate prices for land-holding firms is not significantly different 
from that of future owners before they purchase their real estate assets (columns 4 
and 5). Debt issues become significantly more sensitive to local real estate prices 
after firms acquire land (column 6). Overall, the analysis in this section confirms 
that our main results on investment and debt issuance do not seem to be caused 
by a time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that would simultaneously affect real 
estate ownership and investment or debt sensitivity to the local real estate.
G. A Closer Look at the Real Estate Bubble
In this section, we investigate the impact of the recent surge of real estate prices 
between 2002 and 2006 on corporate investment. This allows us to (i) further test 
the robustness of our results, (ii) reduce the extent of measurement errors, and (iii) 
provide a simple illustration of the methodology used in this paper. This section 
follows closely the methodology outlined in Mian and Sufi (2011) and is similar in 
spirit to that in Gan (2007).
We divide the sample between MSAs with high and low local housing supply 
elasticity (fourth versus first quartile), and between firms owning versus rent-
ing real estate. In order to reduce the extent of measurement errors (see Section 
IC), we collected manually information on headquarter ownership in 2000, using 
Table 9—Real Estate Prices and Investment: The Case of Purchasers
Capital expenditure Changes in long-term debt
Purchaser Purchaser Purchaser Purchaser
Non- before the after the Non- before the after the
purchaser purchase purchase purchaser purchase purchase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MSA Office Prices 0.015 −0.26 0.38** 0.04 −0.29 0.64***
(0.23) (−1.3) (2) (0.7) (−1.4) (2.7)
Cash 0.018*** 0.033*** 0.032** −0.005** 0.0012 0.0012
(6.6) (3.4) (2.3) (−2.1) (0.16) (0.081)
Market/Book 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.016*** 0.012 0.041***
(23) (7.2) (6.2) (6.1) (1.5) (4)
Test “Purch. = Non Purch.” 1.36 1.58
Test “Purch. before = Purch. after” 2.40** 3.11**
Observations 15,794 1,651 1,794 15,956 1,659 1,797
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.47 0.44 0.16 0.24 0.21
Notes: This table compares the investment behavior of non–land-holding Corporations, and of real estate purchasers 
before and after their acquisition of land. Capital Expenditure, normalized by lagged PPE, is the dependent variable 
in columns 1 to 3; Changes in Long-Term Debt, normalized by lagged PPE, is the dependent variable in columns 4 
to 6. Columns 1 and 3 look at the sensitivity of investment and debt issues to MSA Office Prices for firms that never 
own real estate assets in our sample. Columns 2 and 4 look at the same sensitivities for firms that will acquire real 
estate but before they acquire it. Columns 3 and 6 estimate the same sensitivities for real estate purchasers, but after 
they have purchased their real estate assets. Test “Purch. = Non Purch.” presents the p-value from a t-test of equal-
ity of the MSA Office Prices coefficients between the non-purchasers and the purchasers before the purchase. Test 
“Purch. before = Purch. after” presents the p-value from a t-test of equality of the MSA Office Prices coefficients 
between the purchasers before and after the purchase. All specifications control for Cash and previous year Market 
to Book, use year and firm fixed effects and cluster observations at the state-year level. T-stats in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the  information reported by firms in the 10K forms filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.34 We thus take seriously the claim made in Section IC that 
headquarters represent a significant fraction of the nonspecific real estate assets held 
by corporations and restrict the identification on headquarter ownership only. We 
then simply compare the evolution of investment of headquarters’ owners versus 
renters in cities with high versus low elasticities.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of office prices from 2000 to 2006 for MSAs with 
high and low local housing supply elasticity. It confirms that, while the boom in real 
estate prices was more dramatic for the residential market, it also affected commer-
cial prices. Low elasticity MSAs experienced a much larger increase in office prices 
than high elasticity MSAs: from 2000 to 2006, office prices increased by 59 percent 
for low elasticity MSAs, while they increased only by 24 percent for high elastic-
ity MSAs. Figure 2 implements our methodology looking at the cumulative sum of 
capital expenditures relative to initial asset over the period. In low elasticity MSAs, 
the ratio of accumulated CAPEX over the 2000–2006 period relative to initial PPE 
(solid line) ended up 40 percentage points higher than that of firms renting their 
headquarters. By contrast, in high elasticity MSAs, there is no sizable difference in 
the evolution of capital expenditures of firms owning their headquarters relative to 
firms renting them (dashed line). If anything, owners saw a smaller increase in capi-
tal expenditure than renters. Figure 3 leads to similar conclusions on long-term debt: 
firms owning their headquarters in low elasticity MSAs took advantage of the real 
34 Information on headquarter ownership is inferred from Item 2 of the 10K file, which lists the properties owned 
or leased by the firm.
Figure 1. Relative Evolution of Office Prices (High versus Low Elasticity MSA, 2000–2006)
Note: This figure shows the average office price index (normalized to 1 in 2000) for MSAs in the bottom quartile of 
land supply elasticity (“Low Elasticity MSA”) in a solid line and MSAs in the top quartile of land supply elasticity 
(“High Elasticity MSA”) in a dashed line.
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Figure 2. Relative Evolution of Accumulated CAPEX (Owners versus Renters, 2000–2006)
Notes: This figure shows, for each year between 2000 and 2006, the difference between the average accumulated 
CAPEX of headquarter owners minus the average accumulated CAPEX of headquarter renters, for MSAs in the 
bottom quartile of land supply elasticity (“Low Elasticity MSA”) in solid and MSAs in the top quartile of land sup-
ply elasticity (“High Elasticity MSA”) in dashed lines. Accumulated CAPEX is defined as 0 in 2000, and then as the 
sum of all CAPEX made by the firm between 2000 and the current year, normalized by assets in 2000.
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Figure 3. Relative Evolution of Aggregate Debt (Owners versus Renters, 2000–2006)
Notes: This figure shows, for each year between 2000 and 2006, the difference between the total debt growth of 
headquarter owners minus total debt growth of headquarter renters, for MSAs in the bottom quartile of land supply 
elasticity (“Low Elasticity MSA”) in solid and MSAs in the top quartile of land supply elasticity (“High Elasticity 
MSA”) in dashed lines. Debt growth is defined as 0 in 2000, and then as long term growth between 2000 and the 
current year, normalized by assets in 2000.
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estate price boom to increase their stock of debt relative to firms in similar MSAs 
but renting headquarters (solid line) and relative to MSAs where the bubble did not 
have a large impact on office prices (dashed line).
Table 10 confirms this graphical evidence using firm-level regressions. We adopt 
a long-run difference-in-differences strategy and estimate the following equation:
(5)   CAPEX im 00–06  _
Asset s im 
00  =  α m + β  Δ(Office Price ) m 
00–06 
  __ 
Office Pric e m 00  × Headquartersi 
 + γ  Δ(Office Price ) m 00–06   __ 
Office Pric e m 00  + ϵim ,
where  
 CAPEX im 
00–06 
 _
Asset s im 
00  
  is firm i accumulated capital expenditure from 2000 to 2006, 
normalized by assets in 2000,  
Δ(Office Price ) m 00–06 
  __
Office Pric e m 00–06 
  is MSA m office price growth from 
2000 to 2006, and Headquartersi is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i owns its headquar-
ters in 2000, as reported in its 10K file.
Table 10—Headquarter Ownership and the Impact of the Real Estate Bubble
Accumulated capex Changes in total debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Headquarter owner × 0.18** 0.075*
 Δ(office prices) 2000–2006 (2.3) (1.8)
Headquarter owner × elasticity −0.092** −0.1*** −0.043** −0.044**
(−2.6) (−2.8) (−2.5) (−2.6)
Headquarter owner × −0.0025 0.0017
 second quartile of elasticity (−0.038) (0.057)
Headquarter owner × −0.021 −0.0045
 third quartile of elasticity (−0.32) (−0.11)
Headquarter owner × −0.12* −0.063**
 fourth quartile of elasticity (−1.8) (−2.1)
Elasticity 0.08*** 0.086*** 0.006 0.0069
(2.8) (3.1) (0.7) (0.82)
Δ(office prices) 2000–2006 −0.024 0.032
(−0.45) (1.4)
Second quartile of elasticity 0.0082 −0.012
(0.39) (−0.69)
Third quartile of elasticity 0.042 −0.0091
(1.3) (−0.83)
Fourth quartile of elasticity 0.12*** 0.0091
(2.6) (0.8)
Log (assets2000) −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.0035 −0.0032
(−3.4) (−3.4) (−1.2) (−1.2)
Observations 1,696 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,772 1,870 1,870 1,870
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.0091 0.019 0.017 0.0049 0.0023 0.0035 0.004
Notes: This table explores the impact of the real estate bubble from 2000 to 2006, depending on headquarter owner-
ship as reported in the 10k files. Columns 1 to 4 use accumulated capital expenditures normalized by initial assets 
as a dependent variable. Columns 5 to 8 use changes in total debt normalized by initial assets as a dependent vari-
able. Elasticity refers to local housing supply elasticity provided in Saiz (2010). Observations are clustered at the 
MSA Level. T-stats are in parenthesis.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The results from this dummy specification using the information from the 10K 
files are to be compared to column 8 of Table 6.
Column 1 in Table 10 directly estimates equation (5). The results from this dummy 
specification using the information from the 10K files are to be compared to column 
8 of Table 6. Over the period 2000–2006, and in response to a 10 percent real estate 
price increase, a firm that owns its headquarters will increase its investment rate by 
1.8 percentage points compared to a firm that rents its headquarters. The magnitude 
of this effect is similar to the result over the entire sample period 1993–2007 (2.1 
percentage point investment rate increase for a 10 percent price appreciation), and 
somewhat larger than found by Gan (2007) for the burst of the Japanese real estate 
bubble (0.8 percentage points).
Column 2 replaces the local office price growth by the local housing supply elas-
ticity: this corresponds to the reduced form of an instrumental variable regression 
where local prices are instrumented by local housing elasticity. As expected, since 
the higher the local housing elasticity, the lower the increase in local land prices, 
we find a negative sign on the interaction between housing elasticity and the owner 
dummy: in MSAs with a high housing elasticity, price increases have been moder-
ate, and there is not much difference in the investment of owners compared to rent-
ers; in MSAs with a low housing elasticity, price increases have been dramatic, and 
owners increase their investment more than renters.
Column 3 augments the previous regression in column 2 by controlling for initial 
firm size. This is natural, as there is a fair amount of heterogeneity between firms 
that own versus rent their headquarters.
Column 4 uses quartiles of local housing supply elasticity instead of the elasticity 
itself.
Finally, columns 5–8 replicate the regressions in columns 1–4, replacing the 
accumulated investment by the accumulated long term debt (  ΔDebt im 00–06  _
 Assets im 
00  ) as the depen-
dent variable.
Overall, the results in Table 10 confirm the analysis of Figures 2 and 3. Firms 
owning their headquarters experienced a significantly larger growth in assets and 
long-term debt relative to renters, especially in MSAs where office prices increased 
a lot, i.e., in MSAs with lower housing supply elasticity. This effect is monotonic in 
the local housing supply elasticity.
III. Conclusion
When the value of a firm’s real estate appreciates by $1, its investment increases 
by approximately $0.06. This investment is financed through additional debt issues. 
The impact of real estate shocks on investment is stronger when estimated on a group 
of firms which are more likely to be credit constrained. As we showed in this article, 
real estate represents a significant fraction of the assets held on the balance sheet of 
corporations. As a consequence, one could expect the impact of real estate shocks 
on aggregate investment to be nontrivial. However, this is not necessarily the case 
in a world where responses to balance sheet shocks are heterogeneous. In particular, 
small firms respond more than large firms, which attenuates the aggregate impact of 
credit constraints. Understanding how one can go from the micro estimates we offer 
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in this paper to the macro impact of real estate shocks on investment, and therefore 
on GDP, remains unclear. We hope to tackle this question in future research.
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